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APOLLO EXPER IENCE REPORT 
ABORT PLANNING 
By  C h a r l e s  T. Hyle, C h a r l e s  E. Foggatt,*
a n d  Bobbie D. Weber 
M a n n e d  Spacecraf t  C e n t e r  
SUMMARY 
To attain the high confidence level required of the safety aspects of the Apollo 
Program, a practical return-to-earth abort capability w a s  provided for  each of the 
various mission phases. The development of such an abort capability is especially 
complex because of the myriad of potential mission contingencies that can be identified. 
Trajectories that satisfy the requirements and constraints of a safe return to earth and 
that extend to all possible preabort conditions a r e  analyzed. The spacecraft system 
capabilities, ground-support -equipment capabilities, flight-crew performance, and 
other operational considerations and limitations a r e  then superimposed. The resultant 
interaction has led to the development of several  distinct abort techniques and powered-
flight monitoring procedures. These techniques and procedures ensure that a safe 
return-to-earth capability exists throughout the spectrum of anticipated off -nominal 
mission conditions. 
INTRODUCTION 
Although the major objectives of the Apollo Program are to land men on the moon, 
explore the lunar surface, and return the men safely to earth, the safety of the flight 
crew has always been of paramount importance. The stringent requirement for crew 
safety dictates the necessity of as much o r  more contingency planning for  abort situa­
tions as is provided for  the nominal mission. The contingency planning to ensure that 
the crew can always abort the mission and return safely to  earth is accomplished when 
an adequate crew warning technique and a method of escape have been defined. An ade­
quate crew warning technique is difficult to achieve during powered flight but has been 
accomplished by having the crew o r  ground-control personnel (or  both) monitor critical 
spacecraft systems and parameters.  The method of escape from a contingency situa­
tion is often determined by the amount of parameter deviation from the nominal allowed 
by the monitoring techniques and parameter-deviation limits. A method of escape is 
referred to as an abort mode. 
*Presently a management trainee with the Wicks Corporation, Saginaw, Michigan. 
Definition of a practical monitoring technique and abort mode for the realm of 
potential contingencies is the result of an iterative analysis cycle in which the effects of 
various constraints a r e  considered. Such constraints may be caused by either hard­
ware or operational limitations. The characterist ics of ear th  or  moon trajectories (or 
of combinations of earth and moon trajectories) determine to a great extent the set  of 
initial conditions upon which the hardware and operational constraints are superimposed. 
However, the trajectory characteristics a r e  also functions of operational constraints 
(for example, a specific lunar-landing-site requirement), The achievement of a sound 
contingency return-to-earth abort plan is therefore obtained by considering the interac­
tion of many constraints and by satisfying the objectives of an adequate crew warning 
and escape capability. 
Because of the diversity of the constraints encountered during the various phases 
of a lunar mission, independent abort plans must be prepared for each of several dis­
c re te  mission parts.  Basically, these mission pa r t s  include the powered-flight phases 
(launch, translunar injection (TLI), lunar-orbit insertion (LOI), lunar descent and 
ascent, and t ransear th  injection (TEI)) and the coast phases (earth parking orbit (EPO), 
translunar coast (TLC), lunar parking orbit (LPO), and t ransear th  coast (TEC)). 
Acknowledgment is made to W. Bolt for contributing the section on lunar descent 
and ascent and to R. Becker and J. Alexander for  the section on lunar module abort to 
rendezvous and command and service module rescue. 
ABORT PLANNING PROCESS 
For this paper, an abort is defined as the recognition of an intolerable situation 
and the performance of the activities necessary to terminate the mission and return 
the crew to earth. An alternate mission is a continuation of the flight, usually with l e s s  
ambitious objectives than were originally planned. 
The process  used to formulate a 
sound abort plan is shown in figure 1. In 
the abort planning process ,  the spacecraft 
and launch-vehicle hardware capabilities 
and the mission operational constraints and 
objectives a reused  as a basis for simulated 
abort trajectories to investigate display 
adequacy, entry conditions, t ime require­
ments, landing points, and so forth. 
Throughout this process ,  the flight crew, 
flight-control personnel, safety personnel, 
and other responsible groups conduct r e ­
views and discuss and modify the simulation 
results until all groups are satisfied. The 
total abort plan for  a particular mission 
eventually consists of several  detailed docu­
ments. Each document is concerned with a 
unique responsibility, but all a r e  based on 
the same assumptions and a r e  consistent 
_ _  
G r t r a i n t r  and 1 Trajecto? 
considerations simulationr Abort plan 
~ 1 ~- - .-
Hardr+are Targeting Abort report 
l a u n c h  vehicle - Attitudes hl ission ru les  
- 1  
Spacecraft l l a l f unc t i on r  Crew procedures 
Operational AV Recovery pian 
Sequencing Real-l ime program 
Flight l im i ts  
hlodif icatton I 
__ 
Joint panel , l lode 
meetings sty i tc  hove r 
\ l o r k i n q  groups 1Displaks I in i l i i  I 
Crew s imulat ions 
Real-time 
program 
Figure 1. - Abort planning process ,  
2 

I 

with the other documents, Among the documents that most closely reflect the total 
abort philosophy a r e  the Abort Report, the Mission Rules, the Crew Procedures  Manual, 
the Data Priority Contingency Techniques Document, and the Flight Limits Document. 
Development of the abort plan requires  that detailed consideration be given to two 
types of constraints. Although these constraints a r e  generally classified as either hard­
ware o r  operational, each category is composed of a variety of considerations (table I). 
TABLE I. - ABORT PLANNING CONSTRAINTS 
I System o r  category I Constraints 
Hardware 
Launch vehicle 
(S-IC, s-11, 
and S-IVB) 
Spacecraft 
(command and 
service module 
(CSM) , and 
lunar module 
(LM)) 
Propulsion 

Computer 

Guidance and control 

Structu r  a1 

Displays 

Propulsion 

Computer 

Guidance and control 

Optics 
Structural 
Thermal 
Aerodynamics 
. .  -
Emergency detection system (EDS) and 
redundant capabilities 
Redundancy, update, and targeting 
EDS, gimbal lock, and hardover 
EDS and shutdown sequence 
Caution and warning, switch configuration, 
attitude, and entry -monitoring- system 
(EMS) quantities 
Typ e, perf ormanc e, backup capabilities , 
and duty cycles 
Targeting, display, storage, and navigation 
Performance, procedures, backup systems 
autopilots, inertial platforms, gimbal 
lock, and hardover 
Navigation, sextant, telescopes, and field 
of view 
Couch supports, landing, and CSM/LM 
interface 
Protection limitations, pyrotechnics, and 
heat shield 
Stability and t r im  and lift/drag 
characteristics 
3 
TABLE I. - ABORT PLANNING CONSTRAINTS - Concluded 
-__ ~ 
r r p i s t e m o r  category I Constraints 
Hardware - Concluded 
Window/c rew 
geometry 
Consumables 
Sequencing 
-. 
.. __._- -. .-
Trajectory 
Lunar -landing s i tes  
Alternate miss  ions 
Landing and 
recovery 
Communications and 
tracking 
Environmental 
surroundings 
Human factors 
Procedures 
Range safety 
.~ 
Crew visibility to  horizon, manual take­
over, reticles,  and CSM and LM blockage 
Electrical power, environmental system, 
and propulsion 
Attitude requirements, activation times, 
and procedures 
~ _ .  
Free-return mission, orbital altitude, 
launch windows, flight times, and entry 
corridor 
Launch windows, lunar -orbit inclinations, 
earth/moon geometry, and lighting 
Objectives, lunar operations, and 
photography 
Geography, lighting, communications, 
logistics, and medical support 
Systems monitoring and ground targeting 
and command capability 
Atmospheric properties, winds, lighting, 
weather conditions, radiation, and 
meteorites 
Crew schedules, crew acceleration and de­
celeration tolerances, crew and ground-
control response t imes 
Separation techniques, recontact avoidance, 
simple and reliable for training proficien­
cy, and mission-to-mission carryover 
Land-impact avoidance and launch windows 
- ~­
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Malfunctions in any of the hardware i tems must be considered as additional con­
straints.  Obviously, some of these constraints are meaningful only during one par­
ticular mission phase; however, other constraints always exist. Because of the large 
number of constraints that must be considered, abort plans and techniques must be 
kept as simple as possible. 
The constraint of t ime criticality has meaning both in monitoring (crew warning) 
and in abort (escape) mode analysis. Some contingency situations allow more t ime than 
others fo r  making the abort decision (monitoring) and for  making the return to earth 
(abort method). 
LAUNCH PHASE 
Constraints 
Because of potential launch-vehicle breakup and subsequent explosion possibilities, 
the launch phase is probably the most dangerous par t  of any manned space flight. The 
atmospheric environment is a major operational constraint that requires special escape-
hardware design considerations, The launch escape system (LES) is the mechanism 
that provides this atmospheric escape capability. The LES is shown with other major 
Saturn-Apollo vehicle components in figure 2.  The planned or nominal launch trajec­
tory also determines the kind of environment from which the available hardware must 
escape. After the spacecraft exits the significant part  of the atmosphere, malfunctions 
that might occur a r e  significantly less t ime critical; that i s ,  structural  breakup with the 
associated overpressure and f i r e  hazard is less probable because of the reduced aero­
dynamic loading. Every major system o r  category listed in table I influences the launch 
abort plan in some way. 
a u n c h  escape system 
Lunar 
module 
Sa tu rn  P. Apollo vehicles 
Figure 2.  - Saturn-Apollo vehicle 
components. 
Maneuve r Monitor i ng 
Ground-control and crew-monito ring 
activities must include distinction between 
nominal and off -nominal flight performance 
in real time. The degree to which nominal 
flight conditions may be allowed to deterio­
rate is determined by the escape capability 
available at the time. Therefore, the moni 
toring requirements and abort methods are 
closely related. The interaction of these 
two facets determines both the l imits for  
maneuver monitoring and the adequacy of 
a given escape technique. Three types of 
contingencies are of concern, and all may 
be considered the result  of launch-vehicle 
problems. 
The first type of contingency concerns 
premature or  late (either actual or apparent) 
thrust termination of the Saturn I1 (S-11) o r  
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S-IVB. The premature launch-vehicle shutdown situation is more  hazardous in that the 
vehicle trajectory may still be suborbital. The necessity of better tracking and trajec­
tory monitoring capabilities than are available to the crew makes the abort mode deci­
sion in this situation pr imari ly  a ground-control responsibility. 
The second type of contingency includes those malfunctions that rapidly lead to 
catastrophic results.  The time-critical nature of these malfunctions requires  that the 
crew o r  the automatic system -emergency detection system (EDS) - initiate the 
abort, based on an observed or sensed violation of preestablished limits. 
Vehicle attitude ra tes  and thrust-chamber pressures  a r e  the pr imary quantities 
used to activate an automatic abort. The crew initiates a manual abort after receiving 
two abort cues, one of which is usually excessive attitude ra tes ,  attitude e r r o r s ,  total 
attitude dispersions, o r  angle of attack. In addition to the spacecraft computer displays, 
other display devices that a r e  available for  providing abort cues are listed in table 11. 
TABLE 11. - SPACECRAFT DISPLAYS USED FOR ABORTS 
Display 
Abort request light 
Engine s ta tus  lights 
Flight director  attitude indicators 
Launch-vehicle over ra te  light 

Guidance failure light 

S-I1 separation light 

Angle-of -attack indicator 

G- met er 
Altimeter 
Digital event t imer  
Caution and warning mas ter  a larm 
Lift -off and no-automatic -abort 
lights 
Propellant-tank p res su re  
indicators 
Description 
Red light; commanded ON o r  O F F  by ground 
control 
Yellow lights; ON when engine is not operating 
(one per  engine) 
Indicate vehicle attitude, attitude e r r o r ,  and 
attitude r a t e s  (two indicators) 
Red light; ON when r a t e s  a r e  exceeded 
Red light; ON when attitude reference is lost 
Red light; ON if S-I1 first-plane separation 
occurs;  O F F  i f  second-plane separation occurs  
Indicates a combination of angle of attack and 
dynamic p res su re  as measured by the Q-ball 
Longitudinal accelerometer  
[ndicate p re s su re  in fuel and oxygen tanks 
6 

--- 
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An 
The automatic systems -complemented by the crew who a r e  aided by onboard displays, 
window views, and physiological cues -comprise an adequate system for contending 
with rapid launch-vehicle deviations. The adequacy of this system is ensured by com­
puter simulations of the most probable vehicle failures. These simulations a r e  made to 
establish the required limits for an automatic or manual abort. For the most part, 
rapid deviations, such as an engine hardover, would result in an LES abort. Typical 
results of this type of contingency a r e  
shown in figure 3 in the form of rate and 
attitude excursions as a function of t ime 
from lift-off. 
The third type of contingency con­
s i s t s  of those malfunctions with effects that 
a r e  not immediately obvious to the crew; 
these malfunctions may be referred to as 
slow deviations. Slow deviations a r e  
caused by attitude-reference problems o r  
guidance failures and a r e  not as time crit­
ical as the malfunctions of the first o r  
second contingency types. The results of 
such slow deviations usually appear on the 
ground-monitoring displays as deviated 
flight conditions, when compared to nomi­
nal trajectory conditions. To provide the 
crew with the required abort decision, the 
ground controller must know the extent to 
which the trajectory can be allowed to 
deviate before a subsequent abort proce­
dure would violate a crew o r  spacecraft 
constraint. Such constraints as the 
100-second crew-procedure time allot ­
ment o r  the 16g human-endurance limit 
for entry deceleration forces  a r e  used to 
establish these slow-deviation trajectory 
monitoring limits (fig. 4). 
Parameters  for  displays such as 
those shown in figure 4 were developed 
after many studies. The parameters  se ­
lected were generally the most significant 
variables relating the equations of motion 
Abort  l im i t  
Pi tch rate 
. P i tch  e r r o r  
- 2 1  I 1 1 I I , . . I I -1-
78 80 82 84 86 88 90 92 94 96 
Fl ight  t ime. se t  
Figure 3. - Typical t ime history of 
launch-vehicle dynamic variables fol­
lowing an actuator failure. 
I 
\ 
s-ICiS-11 Maximum ent ry  load factor 
Time 0 1  free 
300 000 I t  
a l t i tude 
,ertion 
staging 
'-10 1 - 1 
0 4 1'2 ;b 20 24 28 x IO3 
I n e r t i a l  velocity. V i .  It lsec 
Figure 4.- Ground-control trajectory 
limits. 
to known constraints. This development task has not been simple because the motion 
described by orbital and flight mechanics requires  more than the two dimensions avail­
able for displays. In some instances, two displays were required for  completeness 
(for example, velocity compared with flight-path angle (or altitude rate) and altitude 
compared with range). The des i r e  to have a reasonably common terminology in the 
decisionmaking displays for  ease of understanding was another factor used to select the 
parameters  and constraints on the display shown in figure 4 as well as on most other 
displays. Constraints such as the LES performance l imits were studied and discarded 
on the basis that the validity in their  use as constraints was  ambiguous. 
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Return to Earth 
For  an Apollo spacecraft launch, the abort modes that have evolved from the con­
tingency planning process  can be briefly described as follows. In a mode I abort, the 
LES tower performs the time-critical escape f rom an impending launch-vehicle explo­
sion during atmospheric flight. A mode 11 abort may occur after the vehicle leaves the 
atmosphere, where there  is little chance of aerodynamic loads that can lead to launch-
vehicle breakup and explosion. A mode II abort consists simply of a separation of the 
spacecraft and the launch vehicle, followed by spacecraft orientation to entry attitude 
and a subsequent landing in the Atlantic Ocean. 
As the flight progresses  and the inertial velocity V. increases, controlling the 
1 

t ime increment between launch-vehicle cut-off and a retrograde maneuver was deter­
mined to be the most effective means available of controlling the spacecraft landing 
point. This launch abort technique is referred to as a mode I11 abort. 
If a contingency should a r i s e  in the last  2 minutes of the launch phase, when t r a ­
j ectory conditions a r e  still suborbital, the spacecraft propulsion system can provide 
the transition to an orbital trajectory. Such a procedure, called a mode IV abort, is 
not strictly an abort in that the procedure does not produce an immediate re turn of the 
crew to earth. Because initiation of either of the other two abort modes that can occur 
in this flight regime (mode I1 o r  111) could result in a wide range of undesirable landing 
locations, a pr imary advantage of the mode IV procedure is that landing-site selection 
opportunities a r e  provided. That is, after an orbital state is attained, the spacecraft 
may travel through par t  of a revolution until a desired landing a rea  is approached and 
the crew may then perform the usual entry maneuver. If sufficient propellant remains 
after the transition maneuver and if the original contingency does not require flight 
termination, some mission objectives may 
sti l l  be accomplished. The four launch 
abort modes a r e  shown in figure 5. 
The last few seconds of a launch a r e  
particularly critical because the ground-
control personnel must advise the crew at 
launch-vehicle cut-off whether the trajec­
tory is satisfactory (a status of go) o r  
whether a mode I11 o r  mode IV abort pro­
cedure is required (a status of no-go). 
The important go/no-go decision is facil­
itated by the use of a ground-monitoring 
display such as that shown in figure 6. 
After an EPO is achieved, emer­
gency entry requirements may be sent to 
the spacecraft by the ground-control per­
sonnel. Also, in this situation, the crew 
may use previously prepared deorbit 
data cards.  
(24 000 f t l s e c ~  
d 

' Switchover criteria 
Figure 5. - Apollo spacecraft launch 
abort modes. 
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TRANSLUNAR INJECTION 
Con st raints 
Translunar injection is the powered-
flight maneuver made by the S-IVB that 
sends the command and service module 
and lunar module into a translunar trajec­
tory. This event is noted as a part  of the 
mission profile shown in figure 7. Be­
21.0 2i.8 2i.6 2i .4  2412 2510 2;.8 2d.6 2 7 . ; ~  lo3 cause TL1 begins in an at an 
Inertial velocity, Vi.  ftlsec of 100 nautical miles, the previously dis-
Figure 6. - Ground-monitoring display 
of near-insertion abort decisions for 
Apollo missions. 
Figure 7. - Apollo mission profile. 
cussed launch-vehicle-type contingencies 
that would have required an abort during 
launch may now, because of more flexible 
constraints, be reduced to alternate-mission 
situations. That is, off-nominal S-IVB per­
formance is likely to require thrust termi­
nation but is unlikely to require an immediate 
re turn to earth. Therefore, the CSM has i ts  
entire propulsion capability intact and avail­
able for other uses. 
Because the spacecraft is in a passive 
role during TLI, potential problems a r e  l e s s  
likely to occur in the spacecraft than in the 
S-IVB. However, much premission effort 
is expended in making the warning and 
escape techniques completely inclusive, 
even for unlikely situations. Although all 
constraints in table I a r e  generally applica­
ble, certain constraining factors for pos­
sible contingencies apply only during the 
TLI mission phase. These constraints a r e  
shown in table III. 
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TABLE III.- PRIMARY CONSTRAINTS DURING TRANSLUNAR INSERTION 

Vehicle Constraint 
Hardware 
~ ~~ 
Launch vehicle Guidance and control, inertial references, and gimbal lock 
Spacecraft 
Computer 
Communications 
Guidance and control, inertial references, gimbal lock, manual 
steering, and displays 
Computer -displays and programs 
Optics -window visibility 
Propellants 
Separation and sequencing 
Operational 
Alternate missions 
Minimum orbital altitude 

Entry corridor 

Recovery a r e a s  

. -
Maneuver Monitoring 
Within the context described, the pr imary objective (after crew safety) when a 
malfunction develops is to perform an alternate mission. Therefore, allowable deviated 
flight conditions must be determined in advance to ensure that the desired alternate-
mission capability will exist. Consideration must also be given to the provision of 
reasonable initial conditions f o r  performance of an abort maneuver. These require­
ments have been fulfilled by the development of a crew-monitoring procedure that in­
cludes appropriate S-IVB shutdown limits. 
The crew must be able to monitor and evaluate TLL without ground support, be­
cause the S-IVB second burn can occur out of the Manned Space Flight Network (MSFN) 
10 

tracking range. Generally, TLI occurs 
near Australia in the West  Pacific Ocean. 
A schematic of the basic crew-maneuver­
monitoring technique (fig. 8) shows that an 
abort can be performed for  attitude-rate 
problems, fo r  attitude-deviation problems, 
and for spacecraft system problems. Be­
cause S-IVB failures normally result in an 
alternate mission, only a critical space­
craft system problem is likely to require 
an abort. All four of these monitoring 
rules, as well as numerical limits, were 
established after studies showed that the 
alternate objectives and possibly crew 
safety could not be ensured without them. 
The following items can be noted 
about the TLI monitoring technique. 
1. The TLI ignition wi l l  be inhibited 
if the launch-vehicle attitude before iani­-
tion is more than 10" from nominal, as 
determined by horizon reference. 
2. The S-IVB engine will  be cut off 
by the crew for pitch or  yaw ra tes  of 
10 deg/sec o r  greater.  
Burn attitude 
check (h0riZOllf 
Ignition 
I 
Alternate mission 
or abort 
A 

i Display and I 
1 keyboardcheck I
I 
L---T----J 
r-lBackup cut-off 
I I 
Figure 8. - Basic crew-maneuver­
monitoring technique. 
3.  The S-IVB engine will  be cut off by the crew with the abort handle for attitude 
deviations of 45" o r  more  f rom the nominal attitude. 
4. A backup to the S-IVB guidance cut-off signal wi l l  be performed by the crew if 
the S-IVB has not shut down at  the end of the predicted burn t ime plus a 2a dispersion 
of 6 .0  seconds and if  the nominal inertial-velocity display by the spacecraft computer 
has been achieved. 
The crew is provided with preflight tables of attitude and computer-display 
parameter  values at discrete  t imes during the TLI burn. These tables provide for  both 
nominal monitoring and crew manual steering. If a launch-vehicle inertial-platform 
failure occurs before TLI or i f  attitude-reference signals a r e  lost  during TLI, the crew 
may assume manual control of the burn with the hand controller. Typical problems that 
the monitoring concept can prevent o r  avert a r e  shown in figure 9. 
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v 
1. Nominal  
2. Loss of i ne r t i a l  a t t i tude"  
3 .  Loss of at t i tude-error  signal '  
4. Loss of at t i tude-rate signal a 
5. Loss of att i tude-command signal' 
6. Platform d r i f t  0.13 deglsec 
* 10 sec after TLI ign i t ion 
h 
0 40 80 120 160 200 240 280 
Ground-elapsed t ime f rom ign i t ion,  sec 
Figure 9. - Malfunctions during TLI. 
Return to Earth 
After the investigation of possible 
spacecraft system failures that might occur 
during TLI, no known single-point failures 
o r  constraint factors were found that might 
require  the crew to abort the mission during
TLI. However, trajectory analyses have 
been made that indicate the feasibility of 
performing a simple abort maneuver by 
using the horizon of the ear th  as a reference. 
The decision was reached to develop this 
method of aborting during TLI to protect 
the crew in the event future system-failure 
analyses dictated a need for a TLI abort 
capability. 
A constant attitude of 5"  was  selected 
as optimum by trading off re turn t imes for  
aborts  at  either the s t a r t  o r  the end of the 
TLI maneuver, that is, providing sufficient 
320 	 t ime from abort to entry for aborts  at  the 
beginning of TLI and decreasing the return 
t ime as much as possible for aborts at the 
end of TLI. A delay t ime of 10 minutes was 
selected for the following two reasons. 
1. The 10-minute delay provided the crew with sufficient t ime to orient the space­
craft for  the maneuver. 
analyses requires  the crew to ca r ry  a chart 2 206 6,4
s imi la r  to figure 10 on board the spacecraft g
for use in conjunction with onboard displays $ 204- 5.6 
ance. Although this abort procedure was 2 198 2 3.2 ,' / ./ /' / -10 - L
eliminated as unnecessary on the later * P 196 ~ '2.4 /// /0+' l2 Apollo missions, it was discussed here  to -E 
0indicate the degree to which abort plans E! 194- 1.6 ~4/:-~ - Earth-fixed attitude alinement 
were developed. 	 ? 192 
~ . g
c
5 190- 0 1 . 1 1 1 
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This technique is partially facilitated by the fact that tracking ships a r e  placed such 
that the acquisition of signal always occurs within 10 to 20 minutes after TLI. 
Trajectory analyses indicated that, for any TLI position (geographic), communica­
tions could be established sooner by completing the TLI maneuver than by shutting down 
the S-IVB and coasting in an EPO. Thus, a systematic check of the spacecraft systems 
can be accomplished ear l ie r  by continuing the TLI maneuver. This procedure was 
adopted at the r i sk  of increasing the return-to-earth t ime in order  t o  maximize mission 
success  probabilities if the failure indication should be negative. 
After the decision was made concerning the best possible course of action follow­
ing failure indications during TLI, the abort planning then consisted of determining, 
through trajectory analysis and consideration of the operational constraints, the earliest  
practical t ime that the mission could be aborted should the failure indication be con­
firmed. Among the factors considered were the t ime required to perform the malfunc­
tion check, S-IVB separation, orbit determination, abort-maneuver computations, and 
inertial-platform alinement. The resultant abort t ime is 90 minutes following nominal 
TLI cut-off. Implementation of this abort technique requires  that ground controllers 
compute, during the EPO, a return-to-earth solution timed for  90 minutes following 
TLI. This solution results in a return-to-earth t ime of l e s s  than 18 hours and a return 
to one of five contingency landing s i tes  that a r e  geographic lines located near conven­
ient recovery-staging a r e a s  throughout the world. The 18-hour return w a s  consistent 
with the available time limit established fo r  an assumed pressure-sui t  compressor 
malfunction. The probable recovery a r e a  would be the Atlantic Ocean because of the 
operational constraint that TLI should occur over the Pacific Ocean. 
TRANSLUNAR COAST 
Const  raints  
The abort planning for TLC (if a nominal TLI and a nominal transposition and 
CSM docking with the LM a r e  assumed) consists pr imari ly  of determining which of the 
available propulsion systems should be used for  the abort. With the LM and CSM 
docked, the total vehicle is capable of firing two independent main propulsion systems, 
with each vehicle having a pr imary guidance, navigation, and control system (PGNCS). 
In addition, the service module reaction control system (RCS) is available for maneuver­
ing, and two independent communications systems a r e  available. Also, the command 
module (CM) computer contains an abort program (P37) capable of computing targeting 
parameters  for the CM PGNCS. With transformations, the CM abort program can be 
used in the LM. The following constraints a r e  considered in planning abort trajectories.  
1. The maximum total flight t ime considered is within the spacecraft system 
lifetime. 
2. The maximum entry velocity considered is limited by the spacecraft entry 
heating constraints. 
3. The abort maneuver magnitude is within the serv ice  propulsion system (SPS) 
capability. 
13 
4. The abort maneuver is targeted to conditions within which the crew and space­
craft are expected to operate at an optimum (that is, a t  design limits). 
Three methods of effecting a return to ear th  f rom TLC involve maneuvers that are 
performed before the spacecraft reaches pericynthion and that provide a direct  return 
to earth (direct-return aborts) ;maneuvers that are performed before the spacecraft 
reaches pericynthion and that provide a return to earth after the spacecraft passes  
behind the moon (circumlunar aborts) ;and maneuvers that are performed after the 
spacecraft reaches pericynthion and that provide a return to  earth at that t ime (post­
pericynthion aborts). 
Because the flexibility afforded by multiple systems and maneuver choices does 
not allow for  a simple contingency plan, other guidelines were developed. The follow­
ing guidelines were among those developed. 
1. Circumlunar aborts are not to be performed outside the lunar sphere of 
influence. 
2. The LM descent propulsion system (DPS) will not be used instead of the SPS 
for a direct-return abort. (Also, disposing of the LM before the burn would be a real-
time decision.) 
Return to Earth 
With continuous ground tracking available during TLC, the contingency warning 
decision can be made by the ground-control personnel. With key factors and potential
problems already identified, abort plans f o r  TLC a r e  reduced essentially to real-time 
decisions. These decisions are facilitated by use of the type of data display shown in 
figure 11. Investigations helped reduce candidate displays to the simple necessities 
shown in figure 11. The TLC variables for SPS aborts to the pr imary contingency land­
ing site located in the middle of the Pacific Ocean a r e  also shown in figure 11. From 
trade-offs, possible abort solutions a r e  selected for  arbi t rary t imes (usually coinciding 
with crew awake times) throughout TLC. These solutions are also analyzed before the 
mission to provide the crew with navigation sighting schedules that would ass i s t  them 
(in the event an abort is necessary) in per­
forming the required navigation maneuvers 
11 lo3 
Ground-elapsed t ime at landing. hr to allow a safe return within the entry cor­
l o t  ;5 / 
49 
/ 
73 r idor at the desired landing site. 
The abort maneuver information pro­
vided to the crew in real  t ime for  guidance-
computer targeting consists of abort time, 
AV, longitude of the earth landing site, andl5
entry time. This information is used only 
in the event of a total loss  of ground-to-air 
2 L u n a r  sphere communications.of i n f l uenceI 
0 1 ... j . , . I 1 > ' I  I 1 
4 8 12 16 20 24 28 32 36 40 44 48 52 56 60 64 68 72 The outbound portion of the abort plan 
Ground-elapsed l i m e  o f  abort. hr (from launch to  lunar arrival) can be con-
Figure 11. - Apollo 11 trade-off display. cisely represented as shown in figure 12. 
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Of particular interest a r e  the relationships 
of the various abort modes to each other 
~ and to nominal mission events. As an ex­
4tt i tude 
k v i a t i o n  = ample, maneuver monitoring occurs nom­
15 deg inally during TLI, and an alternate mission 
\ b u r n  t ime = is the preferred procedure rather  than an 
abort at TLI plus 90 minutes, depending on 
the severity of the contingency. 
TL I  + 90 m i n  Direct= l Apol lo 13 T r a n s l u n a r  
10-min SPS Coast Abor t  
Ionboard) 
It is appropriate to mention in this 
section the Apollo 13 contingency that inca­
pacitated the electrical power and maneu-
Figure 12. - Operational abort plan from vering capability of the CSM during the 
launch to TLC. translunar phase of that mission. As a 
result, the TLC postpericynthion abort pre­
viously described w a s  required to effect the 
safe re turn of the flight crew to earth. The abort maneuver was  initiated 2 hours after 
pericynthion passage and was  performed with the LM DPS as previously established by 
the abort plan. 
In addition to providing a previously prepared and rehearsed return-to-earth 
technique, other aspects of the preflight abort planning were used during this emergency 
situation. For  example, backup (to the CSM) life-support procedures and limitations 
using the LM had been identified. Also, the use of window views of the celestial sphere 
to obtain prescribed spacecraft attitudes for performing abort as well as midcourse 
correction (MCC) maneuvers had been developed, and this concept was  used because the 
guidance and navigation (G&N) system was unavailable because of electrical power 
limitations. 
LUNAR-ORBIT INSERTION AND LUNAR ORBIT 
Con st  r a i n t s  
The LO1 burn, which is performed by the SPS, t ransfers  the spacecraft from TLC 
to an LPO. Premature termination of the LO1 burn places the vehicle on an off-nominal 
trajectory from which either an abort or an alternate mission may result. In the event 
an SPS failure occurs, the LM is required to re turn the CSM to earth. 
The development of feasible abort procedures for  the LO1 mission phase must 
take into account many hardware and operational constraints. The major constraints 
that were included in the definition of an operational LO1 abort philosophy a r e  summa­
rized in table IV. 
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TABLE Tv. - PRIMARY CONSTRAINTS DURING LUNAR-ORBIT INSERTION 
.I Constraint category Constraint 
I 
Hardware Engine duty cycles 
Optics -window visibility 
CSM and LM autopilots 
Inertial reference f rames  
Propellants available 
Propulsion pressurization system 
Computer displays 
No onboard abort processor within lunar sphere of influence 
Real-time computer complex (RTCC) processor (single 
impulse only) 
Minimum LM activation t imes 
MSFN tracking and RTCC solution requirements 
Maximum total mission t ime - consumables 
.. - ~.-.- .- - .  .- . .. -~ 
Maneuver Monitoring 
Because LO1 always occurs behind the moon, the crew must be able to  evaluate 
the progress  of the maneuver without ground support. The recommended LO1 crew-
monitoring technique is shown in figure 8. 
The preignition spacecraft attitude check, which is illustrated in figure 13, is 
made more  difficult by the presence of the LM. However, the horizon and several  
s t a r s  should be visible from the CM rendezvous window, and these references may be 
used as a backup to the optics for  the orientation check before ignition. 
craft attitude is not within * 5 O  of nominal, the LO1 should be no-go, because larger  
If the space­
attitude-ref erence e r r o r s  could result in more ser ious problems during this critical 
maneuver. 
Although maintenance of crew safety is always the pr imary objective of the moni­
toring procedures, another important objective is the assurance that adequate abort 
capability is provided and that the capability is compatible with possible results of the 
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monitoring procedures. This objective is 
accomplished fo r  LO1 by definition of sound 
procedures for the four types of problems 
possible during LOI. The four problem 
types a r e  guidance and control, non-SPS 
systems (other than guidance and control), 
the SPS, and inadvertent SPS shutdowns. 
A solution to the guidance and control 
problem is for  the crew to assume manual 
control of the LO1 maneuver, which is nor­
mally controlled by the PGNCS, and to com­
plete the LO1 at the original ignition attitude. 
One of the most dangerous possibilities 
associated with guidance and control prob­
lems is spacecraft inertial measurement 
-50 -40 -30 -20 -10 0 10 20 30 40 50 unit (IMU) drift during LOI. The crew can-
X deq not detect a small  drift until an attitude 
deviation builds up and appears on the 
Figure 13. - Visual LO1 attitude check. 	 secondary inertial-attitude reference sys­
tem. Because the drift could occur in either 
the secondary reference system o r  the IMU, 
the crew is unable to distinguish the erroneous system without using the backup attitude 
e r r o r  needles (a third inertial reference system). Detection of the e r r o r  makes possi­
ble a manual takeover and completion of the burn so that the spacecraft can enter an 
LPO. Because uncorrected IMU drifts  in pitch can produce impact trajectories,  atti­
tude l imits for which a takeover should be initiated were developed (fig. 14). As  is the 
case for  TLI, the ra te  limit for  LO1 is 10 deg/sec because la rger  ra tes  a r e  not within 
normal system operation. If this limit is exceeded, a crew takeover is initiated, and 
manual completion of LO1 at ignition attitude is performed. Non-SPS problems require  
0 - 0 -
Crew takeover 
. 0 2 - 2 - Pitch d r i f t  
Pi tch misa l inement  
.04 - 4 -
Positive pi tch d r i f t  
Negative misa l inement  
.14 - 14 ­
.16 - 16 1 I I 1 I I I I I 
-30 -20 -10 0 10 20 30 40 50 60 
Alt i tude of per i lune,  hpc, n. m i .  
Figure 14. - Effects of attitude-reference 
failures on pericynthion altitude. 
completion of LOI, because it is advanta­
geous to be in the planned lunar orbit ra ther  
than in a possibly undesirable lunar orbit 
in the event an abort is required. 
Manual SPS shutdown occurs only if 
critical SPS subsystem problems a r i s e  that 
would severely res t r ic t  the future perform­
ance of the engine o r  jeopardize the safety 
of the crew. If an inadvertent SPS shutdown 
occurs  and SPS limits a r e  not exceeded, the 
recommended procedure is to initiate an 
immediate SPS res ta r t .  If the res ta r t  is un­
successful and an abort situation exists, the 
LM DPS is used for the abort maneuver. 
In summarizing LO1 monitoring, an 
important objective is completion of the LO1 
burn. Only when burn completion is not pos­
sible should the SPS burn be terminated. For  
this situation, the LM DPS is the pr imary  
source for  the return-to-earth maneuver. 
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Return to Earth 
Lunar orbits that result f rom premature LO1 thrust termination range from highlj 
energetic escape hyperbolas (which result f rom ear ly  SPS shutdown) to stable lunar 
ellipses (which result f rom late SPS shutdown). These lunar orbits fall into three 
general classes.  
1. Escape trajectories (class I) 
2. Unstable o r  impacting ellipses (class 11) 
3. Stable or nonimpacting ellipses (class 111) 
The three classes  of lunar orbits a r e  shown in figure 15. Escape trajectories 
(class I) a r e  orbits with energies sufficiently high to cause escape from the lunar 
sphere of influence. Escape is sometimes caused by ear th  (third body) perturbations 
acting on a spacecraft in a highly elliptical orbit at  o r  near  apocynthion. Unstable 
ellipses (class 11) a r e  orbits with apocynthion altitudes high enough for the spacecraft 
to undergo large perturbations by the earth, but not high enough for the spacecraft to 
escape the lunar sphere of influence. Impacting ellipses (class II) a r e  trajectories that 
~ Approach hyperbola
YLOIburn7, 
Noni mpact e l  I i p rew 
Overburn 
Impact el l ipse 
Figure 15. - Premature LO1 shutdown 
trajectories. 
Trajectory classes 
I Escape
IIUnstable 
I l l  Stable 
I I l l  .~ I 
I 
I I I I 
1 1 I 1 I 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 
LO1 burn time, min 
I I ~ 
I 
Figure 16. - Premature LO1 shutdown 
trajectory classes. 
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a r e  sufficiently perturbed for the spacecraft 
to impact the moon during i ts  f i rs t  approach 
to pericynthion. Stable nonimpacting ellip­
s e s  (class 111) result if SPS shutdown occurs 
during the final portion of the LO1 burn. 
Stable ellipses a r e  defined as orbits with 
pericynthion altitudes grea te r  than 40 nau­
tical miles .  The regions of the typical­
lunar-mission LO1 burn that will produce 
each trajectory c lass  a r e  illustrated in 
figure 16. 
Because the c lass  111trajectories a r e  
stable lunar orbits with a pericynthion alti­
tude in excess of 40 nautical miles, either 
an alternate mission or an abort may result. 
In the event an abort situation exists, the 
return-to-earth maneuver would be s imilar  
to the normal TEI burn and would occur on 
the far side of the moon. In this region, 
the abort maneuver (an LO1 mode I11 abort) 
consists of a single burn that is generally 
within the AV capability of the LM DPS 
engine. 
The abort AV requirements for a 
typical stable lunar ellipse a r e  shown in 
figure 17. The abort AV is a function of 
the delay t ime and desired t ransear th  flight 
time. The AV that is required rapidly 
increases  as the t ime of the abort ignition 
3
10 1: 10 
2 -
~ I l l l l i I l I I 
0 .4 .8 1.2 1.6 2.0 2.4 2.8 3.2 3.6 
Delay time, hr 
Figure 17. - Abort AV requirements 
for a stable ellipse. 
2800 ­
-­2400 DPS AV c dpd bl I Ity 
2000 
Delay l i m e ,  hr 
~­1600 
,A--
is delayed past the LO1 burn shutdown. As 
apocynthion is passed in the ellipse, how­
ever, the more  optimum circumlunar abort 
solutions become available, and the AV in­
creases  to a minimum value just before 
pericynthion is reached. 
During the LO1 burn, if an SPS shut­
down occurs before a c lass  I11 trajectory is 
reached, an abort is necessary because a 
stable lunar orbit has not been achieved. 
The single-impulse abort requirements for  
shutdowns ear ly  in the LO1 burn a r e  shown 
in figure 18 for  a typical mission. This 
type of abort maneuver (an LO1 mode I 
abort) is a function of delay time and de­
sired transearth flight t ime (or desired 
landing-site longitude). The AV that is 
required increases  proportionally with the 
t ime delay before execution of the abort 
maneuver. By superimposing on figure 18 
the LM DPS AV that is available, it is 
shown that the LO1 mode I abort capability 
decreases  as the abort maneuver is delayed. 
The development of operational abort 
techniques for  the early Apollo lunar mis­
sions was  greatly influenced by the con­
straints summarized in table IV. The AV 
capability of the LM was  based on the use 
of the LM DPS engine only, because the use 
of the LM ascent propulsion system (APS) 
engine results in control problems. In 
addition, the t ime constraints of LM activa­
. ~L tion for a pr imary guidance and navigationO L  
20 40 60 80 100 120 140 system (PGNS) DPS burn, combined with 
LO1 burn time. sec the t ime constraints for  ground trajectory-
solution preparation, result in a minimum 
Figure 18. - Minimum AV requirements delay time of 2 hours for  an abort using the 
for  LO1 mode I aborts. 	 LM PGNS DPS. The delay time has no 
effect on LO1 mode 111 aborts because mul­
tiple abort opportunities exist. (That is, 
there  a r e  multiple revolutions in lunar orbit.) However, as can be seen from figure 18, 
the LO1 mode I abort capability is directly affected. 
As indicated in the previous discussion, the limitations caused by the real-time 
computer complex (RTCC) single-impulse abort solution capability (table IV)bound a 
region of the LO1 burn for  which an abort capability does not exist. In the absence of 
single-impulse abort solutions, an operational multi-impulse abort technique that used 
the existing ground computation programs had to be developed. The technique consid­
ered was  a two-impulse procedure that would use the existing real-time single-impulse 
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abort processor  and thus avoid the development of a specialized first-impulse proc­
essor .  Moreover, the first impulse could be specified in a convenient manner by using 
premission data. 
Use of the DPS for  multi-impulse operation necessitates the consideration of addi­
tional hardware restrictions. For example, multiburn operation of the DPS engine in­
troduces constraints on the engine duty cycles, specifically with regard to burn duration 
and coast periods between the burns. A maximum coast-time limit between DPS burns 
exists because of the pressure  buildup in the LM supercritical-helium storage tanks. 
In addition, the duration of the f i r s t  burn must not exceed engine restrictions and thus 
inhibit the DPS re s t a r t  capability. Crew activities and r e s t  cycles also were considered. 
The f i r s t  maneuver of the two-impulse procedure must accomplish several  goals. 
The maneuver must be small  enough to allow a r e s t a r t  of the DPS and must leave enough 
propellant to complete the return-to-earth maneuver. The initial maneuver must also 
result  in a safe intermediate lunar orbit that allows satisfactory delay t ime to the 
second impulse. Following an extensive analysis, the first maneuver was  planned as a 
variable AV burn (depending on the LO1 burn time) directed down the radius vector. 
Selection of the AV value to be used f o r  the corrective maneuver is based on a 
trade-off between total fuel expenditure and intermediate delay time. For  LO1 burn 
cut-offs early in the class I I t ra jec tory  region, a large value of AV is necessary to 
reduce the apocynthion altitude (and thereby ear th  perturbations) to the extent that an 
adequate pericynthion for a stable ellipse (class 111) results.  Conversely, for  late cut­
offs in the class I1 trajectory region, where the preabort ellipse approaches a class I11 
stable ellipse, a correspondingly small  corrective maneuver is required. 
The total AV of the two maneuvers increases  almost linearly with the magnitude 
of the f i r s t  burn AV1, and a trade-off must be made between propellant costs and t ime 
between DPS burns. Increases in delay t ime before initiation of the f i r s t  maneuver r e ­
duce the total AV requirements at the cost of increased delay t ime before the second 
maneuver and generally lower pericynthion altitudes caused by ear th  perturbations for 
the 1GiA:(2X'period orbits. 
In view of these considerations, the final technique fo r  determination of the cor­
rective maneuver is to define the minimum allowable AV 1 necessary to obtain a t r a ­
jectory just inside the class III trajectory region. This value of AV 1 will provide a 
pericynthion of approximately 60 nautical miles  and a time between burns that is within 
the helium pressurization limits. The value of AV, will thus decrease linearly to 
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0 ft/sec at the s t a r t  of the LO1 mode III region. 
The final two-impulse abort procedure (a mode I1 abort) for  shutdowns in the 
c lass  I1 trajectory region is as follows. The corrective maneuver is directed down the 
radius vector. (The RTCC targeting is determined from premission data.) The cor­
rective maneuver is performed as soon as possible after LO1 SPS shutdown (nominally 
at  2 hours for  LM activation and ground-based tracking). The magnitude of the correc­
tive maneuver decreases  linearly with LO1 burn t ime for  simplification of real-time 
requirements . 
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Because the abort capability during 
LO1 is a function of earth-moon geometry, 
LO1 geometry, and so forth, the abort re­
quirements must be determined fo r  each 
particular mission. The total abort A V  
fo r  minimum-fuel re turns  that would have 
been required following an SPS failure 
during the Apollo 11 LO1 burn is summa­
rized in figure 19. The value of AVl is 
shown in figure 20. The pericynthion alti­
tude and the t ime between burns for  the 
LO1 mode I1 intermediate ellipse are 
shown in figure 21. 
During the lunar-orbit phase, a 
return-to-earth maneuver (a mode I11 abort) 
s imilar  to the nominal TEI burn can be 
initiated on each revolution. 
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Figure 19. - Summary of minimum-
fuel abort capability as a function 
of LO1 burn time. 
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Figure 20. - The LO1 mode I1 first-burn Figure 21. - Time between burns and the 
A V  as a function of LO1 burn time. pericynthion altitude following a nomi­
nal f i r s t  burn for  an LO1 mode I1 abort. 
LUNAR DESCENT AND ASCENT 
If an abort decision should be made after CSM/LM separation for the lunar-
landing phase, rendezvous of the two vehicles must be effected before the return-to­
earth maneuver. If descent procedures have also been initiated, the descent maneuvers 
a r e  monitored to maintain rendezvous capability. 
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Descent-0rbit- Inse rtion-Maneuve r and 
Powered-Descent-Maneuver Monitoring 
The descent-orbit-insertion (DOI) maneuver is the first of the two descent maneu­
ve r s  and occurs on the far s ide of the moon. The DOI, a short  retrograde maneuver of 
approximately 75 ft/sec, is performed with the descent engine and efficiently reduces 
the orbit altitude from approximately 60 nautical miles  to 50 000 feet for  the powered 
descent initiation (PDI) . 
The PDI maneuver is initiated at the perilune (50 000-foot altitude) of the DO1 
orbit, which is targeted approximately 260 nautical miles  up range of the landing site. 
The powered descent requires  a continuous thrusting of the descent engine for  12 min­
utes 36 seconds. During this maneuver, the thrust direction and magnitude a r e  modu­
lated as necessary to  bring the LM to a hovering condition over the desired landing 
site.  The pitch attitude profile is designed to allow the crew visual assessment of the 
lunar surface during the terminal phases of the maneuver (from high gate, which is at 
approximately 7000 feet altitude). 
The DO1 maneuver is monitored exclusively by the crewmen because of the posi­
tion of the maneuver. An overburn of 12 ft/sec (or 3 seconds) will cause the LM to be 
on an impacting trajectory before PDI. The maneuver is monitored for  this impacting 
condition by comparing the PGNS performance with that of the abort guidance system 
(AGS) during the burn and by range/rate tracking with the rendezvous radar (RR) im­
mediately after the burn. If the maneuver is unsatisfactory, an immediate rendezvous 
with the CSM is performed using the AGS. 
The powered descent is a complex maneuver that is demanding on both crew and 
systems performance. Therefore, as much monitoring as possible is performed on the 
ground to reduce crew activities and to use complex computing techniques not possible 
on board the spacecraft. Obviously, time-critical failures and near-surface operations 
must be monitored on board by the crew fo r  immediate action. 
The ground monitoring to detect G&N system problems includes direct compari­
son of telemetered data from the two guidance systems on board the LM and data de­
rived from the MSFN. The primary guidance-monitoring source is a comparison of 
the velocity components, the AGS-minus-PGNS velocities, and the MSFN-minus-PGNS 
velocities. In this manner, an erroneous system can be isolated by reference to the 
three sources.  Limits are established on the MSFN-minus-PGNS velocity comparison 
such that a degrading guidance system can be detected early enough that a maneuver 
can be completed on the PGNS into a safe orbit (height of perigee L 30 000 feet) without 
impacting the surface. 
The performance of the total G&N system is evaluated by monitoring the com­
manded thrust magnitude (guidance-determined thrust command (GTC)). Nominally, 
the GTC decreases (approximately parabolically) from an initial value near 160 percent 
to the throttleable level of 57 percent approximately 2 minutes before high gate. If the 
DPS engine produces off-nominal low thrust, the GTC drops to 57 percent later to guide 
to  the desired position and velocity. If the thrust becomes excessively low, the targets 
will not be satisfied and the guidance solution for the GTC can diverge. This divergence 
can result in an unsafe trajectory, one from which an abort cannot be satisfactorily 
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performed because of excessive altitude ra tes .  Hence, the GTC is monitored for 
divergence, and an abort on the PGNS is performed at the t ime of the detection of 
divergence. 
The landing radar  (LR)/PGNS interface is another area of pr ime concern during 
the descent. Without LR altitude updating, systems and navigational e r r o r s  are such 
that the descent cannot be safely completed. In fact, it is unsafe t o  t ry  to achieve high 
gate (the point where the crew can visually assess the approach) without altitude up­
dating. Thus, a mission rule fo r  real-time operation was established that calls for  
aborting the descent a t  a PGNS-estimated altitude of 10 000 feet if altitude updating has 
not been established. In addition to the concern for  the t ime the initial altitude updating 
occurs,  there is also concern fo r  the amount of altitude updating (that is, the difference 
between PGNS and LR altitude determinations AH). If the LM is actually higher than 
the PGNS estimate, the LR will determine the discrepancy and update the PGNS. The 
guidance then t r i e s  to  steer down rapidly to achieve the targets. A s  a result of the 
rapid changes, altitude r a t e s  may increase to an unsafe level f o r  aborting the descent; 
that is, should an abort be required, the altitude r a t e s  could not be nulled by the ascent 
engine in time to prevent surface collision. The initial AH is monitored fo r  accepta­
bility before incorporation into the PGNS navigation. If the AH is unacceptable, it will 
not be incorporated and an abort is required. 
The trajectory is monitored fo r  flight safety at all times. The prime criterion 
for  flight safety is the ability to abort the descent at any t ime until the final decision to 
commit to touchdown. Thus, flight dynamics limits a r e  placed on altitude and altitude 
ra te  to ensure that the vehicle maintains the capability to abort on the APS until the last 
possible moment. The altitude and altitude rates  are monitored by both the crewmen 
and the ground; however, because of communications delays, the ground only advises, 
based on projected trends, and the crewmen a r e  responsible �or protecting against 
flight-safety violations. 
Lunar Module Abort to Rendezvous and CSM Rescue 
From the beginning of the development of the procedures for  the LM abort to 
rendezvous and the CSM rescue of the LM, the pr imary emphasis was  placed on the 
previously discussed powered-descent maneuver and immediate-postlanding phase, 
which a r e  the most probable phases for  an LM abort. A considerable amount of plan­
ning was also done for  failures associated with DOI, for  cases  of no PDI, and fo r  
correct-phasing LM ascents before the nominal lift-off time. 
The original (beginning in 1964) LM-abort and CSM-rescue plans were extremely 
complex because of the limited onboard capabilities. For example, for  an abort at any 
time during the powered-descent maneuver, the LM was targeted for  a constant inser­
tion orbit. Therefore, several  abort regions existed, and the rendezvous techniques 
varied for  each. For aborts early in the burn, the final approach of the LM to the CSM 
was from above; for a la te r  region, one and one-half revolutions were required between 
the coelliptic sequence initiation (CSI) and constant differential height (CDH) rendez­
vous maneuvers instead of the normal one-half revolution; and, for  late aborts, the LM 
approached from below the CSM. Because of this complexity in the LM abort plan, the 
rescue plan was also complex. The CSM did not have the CSI/CDH logic on board, and 
the CM pilot had to depend either on the ground o r  on the "mirror-image" technique 
23 

I I  1111II I 
(that is, the method whereby the CSM applies the LM-computed maneuver in the oppo­
s i te  direction). The pr imary rescue technique fo r  bad-phasing situations was the six-
impulse technique, in which the CSM transferred to a 20-nautical-mile circular orbit 
with the f i r s t  two maneuvers and then adjusted the phasing, became coelliptic, and ex­
ecuted the terminal phase (theoretically with two impulses) with the last  four maneuvers. 
In early 1968, analyses were begun fo r  the incorporation of several  powered­
descent-abort insertion orbits (to vary as a function of abort t ime regions). By late 
1968, this work evolved into the variable-targeting concept, whereby the correct in­
sertion orbit for  an LM approach from a coelliptic differential height Ah of 15 nautical 
miles below the CSM could be targeted for all abort t imes during the first 10 minutes of 
powered descent. For an abort after 10 minutes, a constant 30-nautical-mile apolune 
orbit was targeted; however, an in-orbit phasing maneuver (derived from onboard pro­
grams in conjunction with onboard charts) permitted the standard LM approach from 
below, although one additional revolution was required. For the Apollo 12 mission, a 
second variable-targeting region (through a two-revolution rendezvous) replaced this 
post- 10-minute phasing region. The variable-targeting concept was originally thought 
to be unfeasible because of the software requirements involved; however, after a de­
tailed analysis of the precise requirements, the technique was deemed feasible and 
implementation began in early 1969. 
The variable targeting led to much simplification and standardization of the abort 
and rescue plan. The same basic technique was now applicable for almost all cases in 
which the LM performed the rendezvous maneuvers. The rescue techniques, therefore, 
were standardized; for example, for a CSM-active terminal phase, the CSM would 
always approach the LM from above. By this time, the CSI/CDH logic had been placed 
on board the CSM, and an independent onboard rendezvous solution for  the coelliptic 
sequence could be determined in the CSM. This technique was a great improvement in 
the CSM support of any rendezvous sequence using CSI/CDH logic. Emphasis was 
placed on spacecraft independence because of the uncertainty in the lunar potential and 
because nearly all rescue plans involved only one externally computed (ground) maneu­
ver .  When correct phasing existed initially, no external maneuver was required. The 
addition of very-high-frequency ranging capability to the CSM ensured further independ­
ence and confidence. 
The current abort and rescue plan has been changed somewhat because of the 
change to the nominal plan (landing one revolution later relative to the main CSM/LM 
separation). However, the order of the occurrence of the regions (one-revolution o r  
two-revolution rendezvous) is the only significant change; the basic techniques a r e  the 
same.  The current plan is by no means a simple one; but, compared to the plan in use 
approximately 1 year before the Apollo 11 flight, the current plan is considerably 
simpler and more standard. 
Powered Ascent 
During ascent from the lunar surface, the LM ascent stage is steered by the 
PGNS to effect the planned rendezvous with the orbiting CSM. As described in the 
descent monitoring section, the guidance system is evaluated to determine proper opera­
tion. Detection of e r r o r s  o r  malfunctions could be cause for ascent-maneuver comple­
tion on the AGS. A nonnominal orbit after cut-off caused by an early engine shutdown 
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could require the CSM to  perform the rendezvous to rescue the LM if the LM maneuver­
ing capability were lost. The limiting altitude on CSM rescue of the LM is 30 000 feet. 
TRANSEARTH INJECTION AND TRANSEARTH COAST 
Constraints 
The TEI burn is intended to transfer the spacecraft from i t s  nominal LPO to  an 
earth-return moon-centered hyperbola. At this time, the spacecraft consists solely of 
the CSM combination. Therefore, the sole propulsion source is the SPS because the 
service module RCS is incapable of performing a burn as large as that required f o r  the 
TEI maneuver. The constraints (both hardware and operational) that were considered 
fo r  TEI aborts are s imilar  to those for  LO1 aborts, with the exception of LM-related 
limitations. 
Maneuver Monitoring 
Both TEI and LO1 occur behind the moon, and the monitoring procedures and 
techniques for both maneuvers are basically the same. Preignition attitude checks from 
the CM windows are performed the same as for  LOI. The major difference is that the 
guidance and control and system problems during TEI require a continuation of the 
maneuver; that is, guidance and control problems result in crew takeover and burn com­
pletion at the ignition attitude, and SPS or  spacecraft system problems a r e  ignored until 
the important TEI maneuver has been completed. A backup to the CM PGNCS TEI cut­
off is performed by the crew at 2 seconds past the nominal cut-off time, following 
confirmation that the desired cut-off veloc-­
ity has been achieved (as shown by the 
entry-monitoring-system AV counter). If 
inadvertent termination of the SPS occurs 
during TEI, the engine is restarted,  if  
possible, within approximately 30 seconds, 
o r  a ground solution wi l l  be required for  
a later abort attempt. Manual takeover of 
the TEI maneuver occurs if, as explained 
previously fo r  LOI, the crew confirms by 
use of two independent reference systems 
a 10" deviation from the fixed inertial 
burn attitude o r  if the TEI rate  limit of 
10 deg/sec is exceeded. The attitude-
deviation limit was selected with the aid 
of the data presented in figure 22. The 
midcourse correction required follow­
ing a TEI maneuver that has been made 
relative to  a drifting inertial-reference 
-MCC a i  T E I  c u t - o r r  p ius 
15 hrlP371 based o n  f a s t  
return 163 hrl 
M C C  ai T I 1  cut-ot1 plus 
70 hr lP371 bared on 
5106 return 187 hrl 
-
0 20 4b 60 80 lb 1% 140 16 
TEI bcrn time at crew takeover, sec 
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platform is also shown in figure 22. Figure 22. - The AV for  midcourse 
corrections as a function of TEI burn 
In summary, the philosophy of TEI t ime at crew takeover for  various 
burn monitoring is that completion of the pitch drifts. 
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TEI burn is mandatory; that is, a manual shutdown is not to  be initiated for  any CSM 
system problem. If an ear ly  automatic SPS shutdown occurs, an immediate r e s t a r t  is 
to be attempted. Only if immediate reignition is not possible will an RTCC abort 
solution be required. 
Return to Earth 
The orbits that result from premature TEI thrust  terminations are similar to  the 
orbits that result f rom LO1 underburns; however, the orbits that result from premature 
TEI thrust terminations occur in reverse  
o rde r  and as a function of TEI burn time. 
Therefore, the TEI phase of the mission 
has abort characterist ics s imilar  to those 101-1 TEI TEC
of the LO1 phase, with the addition of the 
R a t e  = 10 deg Rate i 10 degfollowing two facts peculiar to the TEI sec sec 
Att i tude Att i tudephase. Moni tor ing deviat ion = deviation
l imi ts  10" 10" 
1. The increased abort AV capa- A b u r n  A b u r n  
t ime t imebility exists because of the use of the SPS t10 sec + 2  sec 
and the lack of the LM weight. Alternatf SPS 
IRTCCI 
_ _ ~ ~2. There is no backup propulsion M a r u a l  Manual 
system for  a TEI abort. h t i n g e n c y  completion completion 
i rocedure 
During TEC, abort maneuvers a r e  ip t ion 
initiated only if a much-faster-than­
nominal earth return is required o r  if  a 
change in landing position is necessary. F;SPSIP37 
A concise form of the abort plan from 
lunar arr ival  to TEC is presented in Figure 23.  - Operational abort plan from 
figure 23.  lunar arr ival  to TEC. 
CONCLUDING REMARKS 
Some of the planning performed to ensure the safe return to earth of an Apollo 
crew in the event of a contingency situation during a lunar-landing mission has been 
described. In particular, the development of crew warning and escape methods fo r  
each mission phase has been emphasized. The development was accomplished pri­
marily by providing powered-flight monitoring procedures and abort modes that are 
compatible with hardware and operational constraints. Because of the interaction of 
these constraints and because so many systems and components can malfunction, much 
premission effort is required to ensure that abort techniques a r e  available during all 
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mission phases. Although probabilities a r e  low that an abort plan will be put into effect, 
the high confidence level in the Apollo Program is, in part, because of the fact that a 
safe, simple, well-rehearsed abort  plan exists. 
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